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1.

This is a private suit for violation of the reporting

requirements of § 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
Section D(d) requires a person who acquires 5 percent of any
equity security registered under the Securities Exchange Act
to make prompt public reports of his acquisitions and intentions.

l. •

The DC (Doyle) entered summary judgment for Petitioner
because Respondent had shown no irrep~rable injury.

CA7

reversed and ordered entry of summary judgment and injunctive
relief for Respondent.
2.

FACTS.

Respondent, a publicly held corporation based

in Mosinee, Wisconsin, manufactures paper products and plastics.
Petitioner, a Mosinee businessman, decided in early 1971 that
Respondent's stock was a good investment.

By May 17 he had

acquired 5 percent of the oustanding common stock.

The DC

s % ~~
~1-?

accepted as undisputed Petitioner's contention that he was
unaware that the Wil
""'--==

~ams

Act reporting requirements applied
~ -=<:::
=-'
(In Dec. 1970 the triggering provision

~

to 5 percent ownership.

of the Act had been amended from 10% to 5%).
did

~ot

He therefore

report his acquisitions within the 10 days required

by§ 13(d), but in July he learned of the 5 percent reporting
and immediately put his accountants to work

re

preparing the 13D

sc~edul~.

in Respondent's stock.

He made no further purchase orders

The 13D schedule was filed August 25,
'

and subsequently amended.

Both the DC and CA7 rejected

Respondent's contention that the 13D schedule contained material
factual misstatements.
3.

DECISIONS BELOW.

Petitioner admitted that he had

violated the Williams Act by failing to file the 13D schedule
on time.

The only issue was the propriety of the relief

Respondent requested - an injunction against purchasing more

;

~ 2)

It stated that Petitioner was

~O ~ ~nsidering making a tender offer.
~-

~

~

.j,

stock, voting the shares already purchased, or seeking to
gain control; damages; and divestiture· of an unspecified number
~

of shares.

The DC held that Respondent had introduced proof

of only one form of injury from Petitioner's delayed filing:

I

"the anxiety of its employees and shareholders about a future
of
change in control/the corporation." The court concluded that
this anxiety was the sort that would accompany any potential

change in management, but was not the kind of injury that the
Williams Act was designed to remedy.

The court referred to

legislative history indicating that Congress wanted to balance
the regulation of incumbent management and those bidding for
takeover.

Second, the DC noted that Petitioner had made no

attempt to conceal his purchases and that brokers and other
businessmen were aware of them.

Petitioner had not. intenti onally

evaded the reporting requirement; all information had been available since Sept. 29, 1971; and Petitioner had never proceeded
with a tender offer.
CA7 accepted the DC's interpretation of the facts but
took a broader view of the purpose of§ 13(d).

It held that

the purpose of the reporting requirement is "to alert the
marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation
of securities, regardless of technique employed, which might
represent a potential shift in corporate control," quoting
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709,. 717 (2d Cir. 1971).

It

held that Petitioner's failure to report his acquisition on
time allowed him to continue purchasing securities in a market

4.
that had not been adequately warned of his potential power to
gain control of Respondent.

CA7 found that Respondent had been

11 irreparably injured'1\.because its capabilit.Y to respond to

-·

Petitioner's purchases was compromised by his delay in revealing

----

all the facts about his intentions.

--

But, the court added, there

is no need to show irreparable injury to the corporation.
Injunctive relief would be appropriate solely on the ground
that the corporation is the "prime enforcer" of the reporting
requirements, acting on behalf of its shareholders and the
investing public.

Accordingly, CA7 reversed t h e summary judgment

entered for Petitioner and remanded the case with instructions

CD · · ·

to enter a d ecree

enJo~n~ng

p et~t~oner
· ·
f rom

· 1 at~ng
·
§ 13 (d)

v~o

rom voting the stock he purchased between the date
he should have filed the 13D schedule and the date he
filed it, to remain in effect for five years.

actua~ly

The purpose

of the voting restrictions was "to neutralize [Petitioner's]
violation of the Act and to deny him the benefit of his
wrongdoing."
Judge Pell dissented, arguing that Petitioner's "technical"
and unintentional violation of § 13(d) did not justify such a
J "harsh injunctive penalty."

His reasons largely echoed those

of the DC.
4.

CONTENTIONS.

(1)

Petitioner says CA7's decision is

in conflict with an unreported opinion · of CAS, Tri-State Motor
Transit Co. v. National City Lines, No. 73-867 (Apr. 4, 1974).
Tri-State,reproduced in an appendix to Respondent's brief in

5.
opposition, affirmed a district court's refusal to grant
'

'

injunctive relief because the violation of § 13(d) was neither
deliberate, covert, nor conspiratorial.

Respondent points out,

as did Judge Pell, that Tri-State is unreported under CAS's
local
~rule depriving certain per curiam opinions of precedential
value.
(2)
§

13(d),

Petitioner contends that CA7's decision creates for
\. \

1

~hich bontains no remedy, a "lower threshold for

.

imposition of penalties than exists in similar areas of
securities law."

It claims that, in general, .even the SEC

must show reasonable expectation of future violations as a
prerequisite for an injunction.

Respondent says the continued

viability of this rule is subject to question, citing SEC v.
Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969), in which CA2 granted the SEC
an injunction against repetition of allegedly inadvertent
reporting errors.

Aside from this argument, Respondent says

it is appropriate to consider the public interest when balancing
the equities between parties to a proceeding.

Instead of

allowing injunctive relief only if the plaintiff itself can
show specific irreparable harm, relief should be granted on
a showing of harm to the public because private actions are
a "necessary supplement" to the SEC's limited enforcement
resources.
(3)

Petitioner argues that by ordering injunctive relief

without a showing of irreparable harm, CA7 has ignored

I

6.

I
longstanding rules governing the grant of injunctive relief.
Petitioner says the decision"probably" conflicts with this
Court's decisi~ns on the availability of injunctions, citing
Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), and
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13
How.) 518 (1851).

Respondent says that these cases did not

involve the "private attorney general" aspect of suits to enjoin
violations of statutes written to protect the public.
5.

DISCUSSION.

Several recent securities cases have

taken account of public

in~ry

private injunctive relief.

in deciding whether to grant

E.g., Ronson Corp. v. Liguifin

Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846, 849 (3d Cir. 1973) (§ 14(e));
Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (§ 14(e)); Sisa.k v. Wings
&

Wheels Express, Inc., 1971 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.

at 90,670 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (§ 13(d)) (Frankel).
at least ore ~
also has foundation in~this Court's decisions.

~f

92,991,

The principle

Virginian Ry. Co. v. Railway Employees System Federation No.
40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1973).

It seems especially appropriate

in the enforcement of a statute designed to ·protect investors
rather than to affect the balance of advantage between incumbent
management and outside insurgents.
Neither the parties nor the courts below have questioned
the existence of an implied right of action in favor of the
issuer under § 13(d).

CA2 has held there is such an implied

right of action, by analogy to J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
~

I •

U.S. 426 (1964), since

§

13(d) requires the purchaser to

, . +o

send his report to the issuer as well asAthe SEC and each
exchange where the stock is traded.

This is a sensible

application of J.I. Case.
There is a response.
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I

\......,./

Clark

Opns in petn appx;
DC opn also reported
at 354 F. Supp. 686

BENCH MEMO

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

J:,.ewi~li,

?

No. 74-417

DATE:

April 14, 1975

-::fr.

Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.

I recommend reversing the Court of Appeals' judgment
requiring an injunction "sterilizing" the stock Rondeau
bought

during the period in which he was delinquent in

filing a 13(d) report.

In light of the reasons it offers

for r e quiring this decree, the court effectively has held
that every delinquency in filing a 13(d) report requires
such "sterilization".

I cannot see how such a per se

rule is appropriate.

----

Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
/l

'"'

no special penalty or enforcement provision.

~arries

The general

-------------~--------------

penalty statute for the

Exchang~

Act applies: it allows the

SEC to seek a fine up to $10,000 and imprisonment up to 2
years for any violation.

15 U.S.C. § 78ff.

In addition, the

SEC can bring an action for injunctive re l ief.
§

78u(e).

15 U.S.C.

It does make sense to allow the issuer a private

right of action to enforce the reporting requirement, since
the issuer's transfer records will provide the first
indication that someone has acquired 5% ownership, and quick
action is necessary to vindicate the statutory purpose.

The

issue in this case is what relief is apprropriate in such an
action.

2.
The purpose of the 13(d) reporting requirement seems
relatively clear from legislative history.

It was not

intended to protect incumbent management from takeover bids,
but to protect the marketplace.

Any rapid aggregation of

securities can affect the market price,

a · ;

and any threatened change in the control of a corporation

affects the value of its stock as an investment.

The reporting

requirement was designed to alert the marketplace to a rapid
aggregatiun of stock that carries with it a potential for
, control.

It protects stockholders by giving them information

] that may affect a decision to sell, hold, or purchase stock.
It also alerts the corporation and its incumbent management
to the potential for a takeover bid or proxy fight, but this
effect seems to have been a byproduct of the protection for
investors.
Seen in this light, § 13(d) does not support the gloss
the Court of Appeals put on it.

The CA thought that permanent

injunctive relief was necessary for two reasons:

(1) the

corporation had been harmed because it was delayed in making
a response to Rondeau's purchases, and (2) Rondeau must be
deprived of the benefit of his wrongdoing,

i , ~.,

the utility

of the stock he purchased between the filing deadline and the
date he actually filed the report.

The first reason would

support a temporary injunction, designed to postpone a takeover
bid and give the corporation and the investors all the

3.
information they need before the outsider
proceeds with his
' .
purchasing and possible takeover.

But I see no relation

between the harm from delay and an injunction that sterilizes
,---.-

the stock for five years.

- - --

The second reason--depriving Rondeau

of the fruits of his wrongdoing--seems to assume that acquiring
more stock during the pe riod of delinquency was illegal.

As

I read 13(d), there is no prohibition on acquiring stock
while in violation of the reporting requirements.

Again,

prohibiting further acquisitions could be an appropriate
feature of a temporary injunction, because it would keep the
outsiderfrom buying stock at low prices when the prices would
be higher if his plans were known.

I

But I cannot see how the

sterilization decree would remedy any harm done to shareholders
during that period of time.

Its effect will be to reduce the

number of shares required to control the corporation.

This

effect is slight in this case, where only 3% of the stock is
involved, but in other cases a sterilization decree could

rl

effect a substantial change in the number of shares required
to elect a slate of officers or approve a merger.

Such an

effect would benefit incumbent management, and it may or may
not benefit shareholders generally.
th~t

That is not to say

a sterilization decree could never be appropriate, but

it does suggest that one should not be granted as a matter
of course.

The standard relief should probably be a temporary

injunction, combined with a general injunction against future

4.
violations.

Perhaps there should also be an action for damages

on behalf of shareholders who sold at an artifically low
price because of the delayed disclosure, but that issue
is not presented here.
Respondent urges the Court to remand for a full trial
in the event it cannot affirm the CA's order for entry of
full injunctive relief.

That argument is foreclosed by this

Court's practice on cross-petitions.

In the absence of a

cross-petition, the respondent can present any ground (raised
below) in support of the CA's judgment, but it may not urge
modification of the judgment.

The CA reversed the summary

judgment entered in petitioner's favor, and ordered entry of
summary judgment in respondent's favor.

To hold that there

was a dispute of material fact requiring a trial would
necessitate reversing that judgment.

Respondent therefore

cannot attack the propriety of s ummary judgment or the accuracy
of the DC's statement that the crucial facts were free of
material dispute.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-415
Francis A. Rondeau,
Petitioner,

) On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of
v.
Appeals for the Seventh
Mosinee Paper Corporation.
Circuit.
[June -, 1975]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of
the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine
whether a showing of irreparable harm is necessary for
a private litigant to obtain injunctive relief in a suit
under § 13 (d) of the Williams Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78m
(d). The Court of Appeals held that it was not. We
reverse.

I
Respondent Mosinee Paper Corporation is a Wisconsin company engaged in the manufacture and sale of
paper, paper products, and plastics. Its principal place
of business is located in Mosinee, Wisconsin, and its only
class of equity security is common stook which is registered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U. S. C. § 781. At all times relevant to this litigation there were slightly more than 800,000 shares of
such stock outstanding.
In April 1971 petitioner Francis A. Rondeau, a Mosinee businessman, began making large purchases of respondent's common stock in the over-the-counter market. Some of the purchases were in his own name;
others were in the name of businesses and a foundation

74-415--0PINION
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known to be controlled by him. By May 17, 1971, petitioner had acquired 40,413 shares of respondent's stock,
which constituted more than 5% of those outstanding.
He was therefore required to comply with the disclosure
provisions of the Williams Act/ by filing a Schedule 13D
The Williams Act, which amended the Securities Exchange Act
1934, provides in relevant part:

1

~f

" (d) ( 1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the
beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to Section 12 of this title, or any equity security of
an insurance company which would have been required to be so registered except for the exemption contained in Section 12 (g) (2) (G)
of this title, or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1904, is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum
of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition, send to
the issuer of the security at its principal executive office, by registered or certified mail, send to each exchange where the security
is traded, and file wi.th the Commission, a statement containing such
of the following information, and such additional information, as the
Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary
br appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors" (A) the background and identity of all persons by whom or on
whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected;
"(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration·
used or to be used in making the purchases, and if any part of the·
purchase price or proposed purchase price is represented or is to be
represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or otherwise·
obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading such
security, a description of the transaction and the names of the·
parties thereto, except that where a source of funds is a loan made
in the ordmary course of business by a bank, as defined in Section
3 (a) (6) of this title, if the person filing such statement so requests,.
the name of the bank, shall not be made available to the public;
" (C) if the purpose of the purchasers or prospective purchases is
to acquire control of the busin.ess of the issuer of the securities, anyJ?lans or pro,t>osals which such persons may have to liquidate such.

74-415-0PINlON
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with respondent and the Securities and Exchange Commission within 10 days. That form would have disclosed, among other things, the number of shares beneficially owned by petitioner, the source of the funds used
to purchase them, and petitioner's purpose in making
the purchases.
Petitioner did not file a Schedule 13D but continued
to purchase substantial blocks of respondent's stock; by
July 30, 1971, he had acquired more than 60,000 shares.
On that date the chairman of respondent's board of directors informed him by letter that his activity had
"given rise to numerous rumors" and "seems to have
created some problems under the Federal Securities
Laws . . . ." Upon receiving the letter petitioner immediately stopped placing ordzrs for respondent's stock
and consulted his attorney. On August 25, 1971, he
filed a Schedule 13D which, in addition to the other
issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with any other persons, or to
make any other major change in its business or corporate structure;
"(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and the number of shares concerning which there is a
right to acquire, directly or indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii)
by each associate of such person, giving the name and address of
each such associate; and
"(E) information as to any contracts arrangements or understandings with any person with reF:pect to any securities of the issuer,
including but not limited to transfer of any of the securities, joint
ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts or calls, guaranties of
loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits, division of
losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, naming the
persons with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings
have been entered into, and giving the details thereof." 82 Stat.
454, 456 ; 15 U. S. C. § 78m(d) .
The Commission requires the purpose of the transaction to be disclosed in every Schedule 13D, regardless of an intention to acquirecontrol and make major changes in its structure. See 17 CFR
§240, 13d- 1, -101 (1974),

74-415-0PINION
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required disclosures, described the "Purpose of
action" as follows:

Trans~

"Francis A. Rondeau determined during early part
of 1971 that the common stock of Issuer [respondent] was undervalued in the over-the-count.er market and represented a good investment vehicle for
future income and appreciation. Francis A. Rondeau and his associates presently propose to seek
to acquire additional common stock of the Issuer in
order to obtain effective control of the Issuer, but
such investments as originally determined were and
are not necessarily made with this objective in mind.
Consideration is currently being given to making a
public cash tender offer to the shareholders of the
Issuer at a price which will reflect current quoted
prices for such stock with some premium added."
Petitioner also stated that, in the event that he did obtain control of respondent, he would consider making
changes in management "in an effort to provide a l3oard
of Directors which is more representative of all of the
shareholders, particularly those outside of present management . . . ." One month later petitioner amended
the form to reflect more accurately the allocation of
shares between himself and his companies.
On August 27 respondent sent a letter to its shareholders informing them of the disclosures in petitioner's
Schedule 13D. 2 The letter stated that by his "tardy
filing" petitioner had "withheld the information to which
you [the shareholders] were entitled for more than two
months, in violation of federal law." In addition, while
2

Respondent simultaneously issued a press release containing the
same information. Almost immediately the price of its stock jumped
to $19-$21 per share. A few days later 1t dropped back to the prevailing price of $1'2.50-$14.00 per share, where it remained.
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agreeing that "recent market prices have not reflected
the real value of your Mosinee stock," respondent's management could "see little in Mr. Rondeau's background
that would qualify him to offer any meaningful guidance to a Company in the highly technical and competitive paper industry."
Six days later respondent initiated this suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin. Its complaint named petitioner, his companies, and two banks which had financed some of petitioner's purchases as defendants and alleged that they
were engaged in a scheme to defraud respondent and its
shareholders in violation of the securities laws. It alleged
further that shareholders who had "sold shares without
the information which defendants were required to disclose lacked information material to their decision to sell
or hold," and that respondent "was unable to communicate such information to its shareholders, and to take
such actions as their interest required." Respondent
prayed for an injunction prohibiting petitioner and his
codefendants from voting or pledging their stock and
from acquiring additional shares, requiring them to divest
themselves of stock which they already owned, and for
damages. A motion for a preliminary injunction was
filed with the complaint but later withdrawn.
After three months of pretrial proceedings petitioner
moved for summary judgment. He readily conceded
that he had violated the Williams Act, but contended
that the violation was due to a lack of familiarity with
the securities laws and that neither respondent nor its·
shareholders had been harmed. The District Court
agreed. It found no material issues of fact to exist regarding petitioner's lack of willfulness in failing to timely
file a Schedule 13D, concluding that he discovered his

'

.
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obligation to do so on July 30, 1971, 3 and that there was
no basis in the record for disputing his claim that he first
considered the possibility of obtaining control of respondent some time after that date. The District Court therefore held that petitioner and his codefendants "did not
engage in intentional covert, and conspiratorial conduct
in failing to timely file the 13D Schedule." 4
Similarly, although accepting respondent's contention
that its management and shareholders suffered anxiety
as a result of petitioner's activities and that this anxiety
was exacerbated by his failure to disclose his intentions
until August 1971, the District Court concluded that
similar anxiety "could be expected to accompany any
change in management," and was "a predictable consequence of shareholder democracy." It fell far short of
the irreparable harm necessary to support an injunction
and no other harm was revealed by the record; as
amended, petitioner's Schedule 13D disclosed all of the
information to which respondent was entitled, and he
had not proceeded with a tender offer. Moreover, in the
view of the District Court even if a showing of irreparable harm were not required in all cases under the securities laws, petitioner's lack of bad faith and the absence
3 The District Court pointed out that prior to December 10, 1970,
a Schedule 13D was not required until a person's holdings exceeded
10% of a corporation's outstanding equity securities, see Pub. L.
No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497, and credited petitioner's testimony that
he believed the 10% requirement was still in effect at the time he
made his purchases. Indeed, the rhairman of respondent's board
of cfirectors was not familiH with the Williams Act's filing requirement until shortly before he sent the July 30, 1971 letter.
4 The District Court also concluded that respondent's management was not unaware of petitioner's activities with respect to its
stock. It found that by .July 1971, there was considerable "street
talk" among brokers, bankers, and busmessmen regarding his pur-·
chases and that the chairman of respondent's board had been monitoring them.
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of damage to respondent made this "a particularly inappropriate occasion to fashion equitable relief . . .. "
Thus, although petitioner had committed a technical vio~
lation of the Williams Act, the District Court held that
respondent was entitled to no relief and entered summary
judgment against it. 5
The Court of Appeals reversed with one judge di~
senting. The majority stated that it was "giving effect"
to the District Court's findings regarding the circumstances of petitioner's violation of the Williams Act,6 but
concluded that those findings showed harm to respondent
because "it was delayed in its efforts to make any necessary response to" petitioner's potential to take control of
the company. In any event, the majority was of the
view that respondent "need net show irreparable harm
as a prerequisite to obtaining permanent injunctive relief
in view of the fact that as issuer of the securities it is in
the best position to assure that the filing requirements
of the Williams Act are being timely and fully complied
with and to obtain speedy and forceful remedial action
when necessary." 500 F. 2d 1011, 1016- 1017. The
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court
with instructions that it enjoin petitioner and his co~
defendants from further violations of the Williams Act
and from voting the shares purchased between the due
date of the Schedule 13D and the date of its filing for
a period of five years. It considered "such an injunctive
decree appropriate to neutralize [petitioner's] violation
of the Act and to deny him the benefit of his wrongdoing." 500 F . 2d, at 1017.
5 The District Court al~o dismissed respondent 's claims that petitioner had violated other provisions of the Securities Laws. Review
of these ruling;;: was not sought in the Court of Appeals, and they
are not now before us.
6
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court that
t he disclosures in petitioner's amended Schedule 13D were adequate.
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We granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict
among the courts of appeals and because of the importance of the question presented to private actions under
the Federal Securities Laws. We disagree with the Court
of Appeals' conclusion that the traditional standards for
extraordinary equitable relief do not apply in these circumstances, and reverse.
II
As in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, it
is conceded here that petitioner's delay in filing the
Schedule 13D constituted a violation of the Williams Act.
The narrow issue before us is whether this record supports the grant of injunctive relief, a remedy whose basis
"in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm
and inadequacy of legal remedies." Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500, 506-507 (1959).
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondent suffered "harm" sufficient to require sterilization of petitioner's stock need not long detain us. The purpose of
the Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders
who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock
will not be required to respond without adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the
offering party. 7 By requiring disclosure of information
7 The Senate Report describes the dilemma facing such a shareholder as follows:
"He has many alternatives. He can tender all of his shares immediately and hope they all are purchased. However, if the offer
is for less than all the outstanding shares, perhaps only a part of
them will be taken. In these instances, he will remain a shareholder
in the company, under a new management which he has helped to
install without knowing whether it will be good or bad for the
company.
"The shareholder, as another alternative. may wait to see if a
better offer develops, but if he tenders late, he runs the risk that
none of his shares will be taken. He may also sell his shares in the-
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to the target corporation as well as the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Congress intended to do no more
than give incumbent management an opportunity to express and explain its position. The Congress expressly
disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of stock which would create the potential
for such attempts. Indeed, the Act's draftsmen commented upon the "extreme care" which was taken "to
avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor
of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid." S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
p. 3 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
p. 4 (1968). See also Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F. 2d 937, 947 (CA2 1969).
The short of the matter is that none of the evils to
which the Williams Act was directed has occurred
or is threatened in this case. Petitioner has not attempted to obtain control of respondent, either by a cash
tender offer or any other device. Moreover, he has now
filed a proper Schedule 13D, and there has been no suggestion that he will fail to comply with the Act's requirement of reporting any material changes in the information
contained therein. 15 U. S. C. § 78m (d)(2); 17 CFR
§ 240.13d-2 (1974). On this record there is no likelihood
that respondent's shareholders will be disadvantaged
should petitioner make a tender offer, or that respondent
will be unable to adequately place its case before them
should a contest for control develop. Thus, the usual
market and hope for the best. Without knowledge of who the bidder
is and what he plans to do, the shareholder cannot reach an informed"
decision." S. Rep . No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1967) .
However, the Report also recognized "that takeover bids should'
not be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing;
a. check on entrenched btli inefficient management. /d., at 3,

'
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basis for injunctive relief, "that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation," is not present here.
United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 633
(1953). See also Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65, 82 (1902).
Nor are we impressed by respondent's argument that
an injunction is necessary to protect the interests of its
shareholders who either sold their stock to petitioner at
predisclosure prices or would not have invested had they
known that a takeover bid was imminent. Brief for
Respondent, at 13, 20-21. As observed, the principal
object of the Williams Act is to solve the dilemma of
shareholders desiring to respond to a cash tender offer,
and it is not at all clear that the type of "harm" identified by respondent is redressable under its provisions.
In any event, those persons who allegedly sold at an unfairly depressed price have an adequate remedy by way
of an action for damages, thus negating the basis for
equitable relief. 8 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 595 (1952) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Similarly, the fact that the second group of
shareholders for whom respondent expresses concern have
retained the benefits of their stock and the lack of an
imminent contest for control make the possibility of damage to them remote at best. See Truly v. Wanzer, 5
How. 141, 142-143 (1847).
We turn, therefore, to the Court of Appeals' conclusion
that respondent's claim was not to be judged according
to traditional equitable principles, and that the bare
fact that petitioner violated the Williams Act justified
8 The Court was advised by respondent that such a suit is now
pending in the District Court and clatJS action certification has been
sought. Although we intimate no views regarding the merits of that
case, that course provides a potential sanction for petitioner's viola1(ion of the Williams A.ct wh~ch is not insig_nificant.
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entry of an injunction against him. This position would
seem to be foreclosed by Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S.
321 (1944). There, the administrator of the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 brought suit to redress violations of that statute. The fact of the violations was
admitted, but the District Court declined to enter an
injunction because they were inadvertent and the defendant had taken immediate steps to rectify them. This
Court held that such an exercise of equitable discretion
was proper despite § 205 (a) of the Act, which provided
that an injunction or other order "shall be granted" upon
a showing of violation, obesrving:
"We are dealing with the requirements of equity
practice with a background of several hundred years
of history. . . . The historic injunctive process was
designed to deter, not to punish. The essence of
equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather
than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of
mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between
the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims. We do not believe
that such a major departure from that long tradition
aa is here proposed should be lightly implied." 321
U. S., at 329-330. (Emphasis added).
This reasoning applies a fortiori to actions involving
only "competing private claims," and suggests that the
District Court here was entirely correct in insisting that
respondent satisfy the traditional prerequisites of extraordinary equitable relief by establishing irreparable harm.
Moreover, the District Judge's conclusions that petitioner acted in good faith and that he promptly filed a
Schedule 13D when his attention was called to this obli-
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gation 9 support the exercise of its sound judicial discretion to deny an application for an injunction, relief
which is historically "designed to deter, not to punish"
and to permit the court "to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case:" 321 U. S., at 329. As
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS aptly pointed out in Hecht Co.,
the "grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders
hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any
and all circumstances." Ibid. (emphasis by Court) .
Respondent urges, however, that the "public interest"
must be taken into account in considering its claim for
relief and relies upon the Court of Appeals' conclusion
that it is entitled to an injunction because it "is in the
best position" to ·insure that the Williams Act is complied
with by purchasers of its stock. This argument misconceives, we think, the nature of the litigation. Although
neither the availability of a private suit under the Williams Act nor respondent's standing to bring it has been
questioned here, this cause of action is not authorized by
the statute or its legislative history. Rather, respondent
'is asserting a so-called implied private right of action
established by cases such as J. 1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U. S. 426 (1964). Of course, we have not hesitated to
9 In its brief on the merits respondent argue; that "genuine issues
of material fact exist as to the knowledge, motives, purposes and
plans in [petitioner's] rapid acquisition of" its stock and that, at
the very least, the case should be remanded for trial on these issuE:S.
This pomt wa;; not raised in the petition for certiorari or respond.
ent's opposition thereto, nor was it made the subject of a crosspetition. Because it would alter the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, which like that of the District Court had effectively put
an end to the litigation, rather than providing an alternative ground
for affirmmg it, we will not consider the argument when raised in
this manner. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co ., 396 U. S. 375, 38!
n . 4 (1970); Morley C'onstr . Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., :300 U. S.
185, 191-192 (1937) . Cf Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349,
51 n. * (1958),

a
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recognize the power of federal courts to fashion private
remedies for securities laws violations when to do so is
consistent with the legislative scheme and necessary for
the protection of investors as a supplement to enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Compare J. I. Case Co . v. Borak, supra, with Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, U. S. ( 1975). However, it by no means follows that the plaintiff in such an action is relieved of the burden of estab~
lishing the traditional prerequisites of relief. Indeed, our
cases hold that quite the contrary is true.
In Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U. S.
282 ( 1940), this Court was called upon to decide whether
the Securities Act of 1933 authorized purchasers of securi~
ties to bring an action to resciml an allegedly fraudulent
sale. The question was answered affirmatively on the
basis of the statute's grant of federal jurisdiction to "enforce any liability or duty" created by it. The Court's
reasoning is instructive :
"The power to enforce implies the power to make
effective the right of recovery afforded by the Act.
And the power to make the right of recovery effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions normally available to the litigant
according to the exigencies of the particular case. If
petitioners' bill states a cause of action when tested
by the customary rules governing suits of such character, the Securities Act authorizes maintenance of
the suit . . . ." 311 U. S., at 288.
In other words, the conclusion that a private litigant
could maintain an action for violation of the 1933 Act
meant no more than that traditional remedies were available to redress any harm which he may have suffered;
it provided no basis for dispensing with the showing required to obtain relief. Significantly, this passage was
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relied upon in Boark with respect to actions under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 377 U. S., at 433434.
Any uncertainty regarding the nature of relief avail- )
able to a person asserting an implied private right of
action under the Securities Laws was resolved in Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U'. S. 375 ( 1970). There we
held that complaining shareholders had proven their case
under § 14 (a) of the 1934 Act by showing that misleading statements in a proxy solicitation were material and
that the solicita·~ion itself "was an essential link in the
accomplishment of" a merger. We concluded that any
stricter standard would frustrate private enforcement of
the proxy rules, but Mr Justice Harlan took pains to
point out that:

"Our conclusion that petitioners have established
their case by showing that proxies necessary to approval of the merger were obtained by means of a
materially misleading solicitation implies nothing
about the form of relief to which they may be entitled. . . . In devising retrospective relief for violation of the proxy rules, the federal courts should
consider the same factors that would govern the relief granted for any similar illegality or fraud ....
In selecting a remedy the lower courts should exercise 'the sound discretion which guides the determinations of courts of equity,' keeping in mind the
role of equity as 'the instrument for nice adjustment
and reconciliation between the public interest and
private needs as well as between competing private
claims.' " 396 U. S., at 386, quoting Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U. S., at 329. (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering further the remedies which might be ordered,
we observed that "the merger should be set aside only
if a court of equity concludes, from all the circumstances)
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that it would be equitable to do so," and that "damages
should be recoverable only to the extent that they can be
shown." 396 U. S., at 388, 389.
Mills could not be plainer in holding that the questions
of liability and relief are separate in private actions under
the Securities Laws, and that the latter is to be determined according to traditional principles. Thus, the fact
that respondent is pursuing a cause of action which has
been generally recognized to serve the public interest provides no basis for concluding that it is relieved of showing
irreparable harm and other •usual prerequisites for
injunctive relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded
to it with directions to reinstate the judgment of th ·
District Court.
So ordered.

Memorandum to Justice Powell
From Penny Clark
Re:

Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.

No. 74-415

I have reviewed the opinion, and I see nothing that
should prevent or delay your joining it.

My only hesitation

relates to something the opinion does not say:

that it

deals generally with the issuance of a permanent injunction
following a completed violation of § 13(d),

and~~:

ca:e

does not require decision on the availability of a preliminary
injunction pending compliance with § 13(d).

[That is, if

the corporation learned that a shareholder had passed the
5% mark and immediately sued to enjoin further purchases or the
launching of a takeover bid
/until he filed the necessary report.] I am uncertain whether
such a situation would be covered by the standard formula

'

of "irreparable injury" but I am convinced that a preliminary
injunction of that sort would be the best possible way to
enforce

§

13(d).

I would not think it important enough to condition
your join, but I wonder if we couldn't ask the Chief to
add somewhere a footnote to the following effect:
"Because this case involves only the availability
of injunctive relief to remedy a § 13(d) violation
following compliance with the reporting requirement,
it does not require us to decide whether or under
what circumstances a corporation could obtain a
decree enjoining a shareholder who is currently in
violation of § 13(d) from acquiring further shares,
exercising voting rights, or launching a takeover
bid, pending compliance with the reporting requirements o"
penny

$>tipumt Qtuurl of tlft ~b $>bdt.&'
~as- Jri:ngLm. ID. <q. zn&rJt.$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

.June 4, 1975

Re: No. 74-415, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.
Dear Chief,
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in this
case.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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'J)iMlfi:ngill1t, lfJ. <!f. Zll~J!.~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 5, 1975

Re: No. 74-415, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.
Dear Chief,
I think the proposed new footnote on page 9 is

fine.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

/
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CHAMI!IERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 5, 1975

Re:

No. 74-415 - Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.

Dear Chief:
Join me, please.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

J
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 5, 1 975

Re:

74-415 - Rondeau v. Mosi n ee Pap er Corp.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFER E NCE:

A suggestion has been made that a footnote be added to the
sentence on page 9 beginning with "Moreover • • • • 11

I
"Because this case involves only the availability
of injunctive relief to remedy a § 13(d) violation
following compliance with the reporting requirement,
it does not require us to decide whether or under
what circumstances a corporation could obtain a
decree enjoining a shareholder who is currently in
violation of § 13(d) from acquiring further shares,
exercising voting rights, or launching a takeover
bid, pending compliance with the reporting requirements. 11
This helps put a focus on alternative means of dealing with
situations like this and it is acceptable to me. If those joining me
have no objection, I am glad to add this.
Regards,

5, 1975

Paper Corp.

No.

Please join me in your opinion for the Court.
It does occur to me that it might be helpful to add
a footnote, at some appropriate place, aLrnng the following
linea:
"~cause this case involves only the availability
of injunctive relief to remedy a S 13(d) violation
following compliance with the reporting requirement,
it does not require us to decide whether or under
what circumstances a corporation could obtain a
decree enjoining a shareholder who is currently in
violation of S 13{d) from acquiring further shares,
exercising voting rights, or laundhing a takeover
bid, pending compliance with the reporting requirements."

':
Although I think such a note might be useful, I leave
, this entirely to your judgment.
Sincerely.

The Chief Justice
,,

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

<!fttttrl cf t4t ~ttitt~ ~hdig
~ZU!Irhtgtott. !9. <!f. 20,?-'*~

~ttp-rtutt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

j

June 6, 1975

Re:

No. 74-415

-

Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your circulation of June 4 as supplemented with the new footnote proposed for page 9.
Sincerely,

~te.l

The Chief Justice

cc:

The Conference

.fr,;:-.rn:t ~M::-t <if tqt~~ ~tafts
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 11, 197 5

Re:

/

74-415 - Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

To eliminate what could be read as an internal
in<7onsistency between the statement on page 9 of my draft
that "Petitioner has not attempted to obtain control, 11 and
the disclosure quoted on page 4, I am adding a footnote keyed
to the sentence ending with "attorney, 11 page 3, line 16:

I
Although some outstanding orders were
filed after July 30, 1971, petitioner placed no
new orders for respondent's stock after that date.
Regards,

.®tt.prrnu Qf01ttf of tire :lthtitc2t .§falcg
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CHAMBERS Of'

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Re:

June 11, 1975

V'

Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., No. 74-415

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely,
William 0. Douglas

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference
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June 11, 1975

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 74-415 -- Francis A. Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corporation

Dear Bill:
Please add to your dissent the following:
"Mr. Justice Marshall also dissents.
Sincerely,

·_-;/ (

./,

T. M.
Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference
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